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“ASLEEP AT THE SWITCH”? THE NEED
TO HOLD SOPHISTICATED CREDITORS TO
HIGHER STANDARDS IN CHAPTER 11
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a family of five has asked you to customize a car that
would accommodate each of their individual tastes—something modern
with a retro feel, with all of the latest features but without any of the clutter,
a unique body design with their family crest, and more. You spend hours
devising a plan, present your specifications for every aspect of the project,
and hearing no objection from your clients, you begin construction of the
car—poring over every detail until you most certainly have outdone
yourself and created a masterpiece. Although the husband and children nod
eagerly in approval, the wife now objects and reveals that she doesn’t care
too much for the leather interior. “Sorry,” she says, “but we won’t be taking
the car like this.”
Why hadn’t she protested earlier? Your clients were fully notified of
your plans—down to every last detail. Nevertheless, you can certainly make
the changes, but at what additional cost? As a seller, however, you are not
without protection. The Uniform Commercial Code and common law have
evolved to provide both sellers and buyers alike with procedural rights and
remedies to protect their competing interests. 1 In contrast, however, the
Bankruptcy Code and common law still struggle to reconcile competing
interests of debtors and creditors. Unlike our family of five, Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings involve potentially thousands of
claimants. 2 Yet, according to one critic, the nature of the provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the
Federal Rules), in conjunction with general disagreement over the
“fundamental mechanics” of Chapter 11, have “render[ed] bankruptcy court
orders, including orders of confirmation, and plans highly unstable.” 3
Instability threatens the purpose of reorganization, which requires finality to
1. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC), a seller is not without protection.
Particularly in sales of “specially manufactured goods” and nonconforming tenders, sellers have a
statutory right to cure a defect upon receiving timely notice, and—in cases of breach of contract—
recover the contract price. UCC § 2-201(3)(a) (2014); see also Thomas R. Malia, Sales:
“Specially Manufactured Goods” Statute of Frauds Exception in UCC § 2-201(3)(a), 45 A.L.R.
4th 1126 § 3 (1986) (identifying contracts for specially manufactured goods and not suitable for
sale to others as enforceable where sellers have taken substantial steps to manufacture goods).
However, the UCC and common-law protections are not without fault. One commentator
criticizes courts for overprotecting consumers. Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer?
Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice of Breach in Nonprivity Context, 66 N.C. L. REV. 107 (1987).
2. Robert M. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in Bankruptcy Cases, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1218 (1994) (pointing out that reorganization can involve thousands
of claimants).
3. Ralph E. Avery, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Principles of Res Judicata, 102 COM. L.J.
257, 304–05 (1997).
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ensure that creditors are protected and debtors are afforded a “fresh start.”
A recent opinion by the Fifth Circuit, In re S. White Transportation, 4
demonstrates the instability of Chapter 11 orders of confirmation and calls
attention to the need for greater protection for commercial debtors seeking
relief. Under the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, a creditor that receives effective
notice repeatedly throughout Chapter 11 proceedings can thwart
reorganization by asserting its claim even after the court has approved a
final plan. The opinion challenges the authoritativeness of confirmed
reorganization plans and diminishes the impact of receiving effective notice
by adopting an unprecedented participation analysis.
This Note explores the implications, for debtors and creditors alike, of
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re S. White Transportation, which requires,
but does not outline, a need for “something more” 5 than passive receipt of
notice of bankruptcy to constitute participation in Chapter 11
reorganization. 6 Specifically, this Note considers the decision’s
implications for commercial debtors. Part I of this Note explores the
purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization and traces the evolution of
the Bankruptcy Code and common law through key circuit court opinions.
The remainder of this Note analyzes the Fifth Circuit opinion in In re S.
White Transportation, some important questions it raises, and potential
solutions for consideration. Part II challenges the need for “something
more” 7 by weighing the necessity of a “more than passive receipt” 8
requirement and scrutinizing the sophistication of creditors involved. Part
III evaluates the economic viability of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
permitting creditors to take a “wait-and-see” posture. Finally, this Note
recommends holding sophisticated creditors to a higher standard of review
during Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
I. CHAPTER 11: EVOLUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
AND COMMON LAW
Congress developed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to provide
troubled individual and business debtors with a “second chance”—an
opportunity to salvage and rebuild under the protection of judicial process
in the interest of economic efficiency.

4. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 494
(5th Cir. 2013).
5. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R.
695, 703 (S.D. Miss. 2012), rev’d, In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
2011).
6. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 498 (holding that “meeting the participation
requirement in In re Ahern Enterprises requires more than mere passive receipt of effective
notice”).
7. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 473 B.R. at 509.
8. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 498.
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The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is
to restructure a business’s finances so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for
its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets
that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed
are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return
on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to compensate those
who have invested in the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and
require creditors of the business, both trade creditors and long-term
lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the business can extend or
reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a viable state. It is more
economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves
9
jobs and assets.

For these policy reasons, the debtor in possession 10 or appointed
trustee 11 is allowed to operate its business 12 under the protection of Chapter
11 by wielding the shield of the automatic stay. 13 Effective upon filing, the
automatic stay preserves the debtor’s estates and keeps creditors from
attempting to collect claims that arose prior to the petition for bankruptcy. 14
During a lengthy reorganization process, which can take several months to
over a year, 15 it is in the interest of both the debtor and its creditors to
proceed expeditiously in order to maximize creditor recovery and minimize
further harm to the debtor. 16 Successful bankruptcy reorganizations depend
on the bankruptcy court’s power to bind parties to a single authoritative
judgment 17 and, in effect, discharge debtors of prepetition liability upon
confirmation of a plan. 18 Debtors depend on the discharge of prepetition
debt in order to effectively reorganize. 19
A. EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION: THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Traditionally, courts have applied the principle that “liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected”—theoretically, even after Chapter 11

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012) (defining a Chapter 11 debtor as a “debtor in possession”).
Id. § 1104 (describing how trustees may be appointed in Chapter 11 cases).
Id. § 1108.
Id. § 362(a).
Id.
The Bankruptcy Code affords debtors with an exclusive right to file a plan of
reorganization for the first 120 days of a case, and the period may be extended but cannot exceed
eighteen months. Id. § 1121(b), (d).
16. Eric S. Richards, Due Process Limitations on the Modification of Liens Through
Bankruptcy Reorganization, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 108 (1997).
17. Lawless, supra note 2, at 1216.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1).
19. Laura B. Bartell, Due Process for the Unknown Future Claim in Bankruptcy—Is This
Notice Really Necessary?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339, 340–41 (2004).
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confirmation. 20 The principle dates back to the nineteenth century U.S.
Supreme Court opinion in Long v. Bullard, nearly ninety-two years before
the modern Bankruptcy Code was first enacted in 1978. 21 In Long v.
Bullard, 22 the Court held that where “the creditor neither proved his debt in
bankruptcy nor released his lien . . . , his security was preserved not
withstanding the bankruptcy of his debtor.” 23 This principle, out of concern
for unjust violation of creditors’ rights, was codified in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 24 and began to morph with the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. 25 Growing differences as to the extent of which
debtors may be discharged of liability, however, challenge the applicability
of the principle today. 26 Particularly in the context of Chapter 11
reorganization, mechanisms that allow for claim abrogation or
extinguishment make clear that “the principle that liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected cannot be taken literally.” 27
Section 1141, outlining the effect of confirmation, provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing
securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, and
any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor,
whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor, equity security
holder, or general partner is impaired under the plan and whether or not
such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner has accepted the
plan.
....
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section and
except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the
plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is
free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security
28
holders, and of general partners in the debtor.

20. Beth A. Buchanan Staudenmaier, Note, Survival of Liens: “Liens Pass Through
Bankruptcy Unaffected”—Or Do They? In re Penrod—Challenging an Adage: In re Penrod, 50
F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995), 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445, 447 (1996).
21. Id. at 447–48.
22. 117 U.S. 617 (1886).
23. Id. at 620–21.
24. Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 448 n.26.
25. Id. at 448–49.
26. Id. at 448 (noting that courts have disagreed on “the extent the principle is applicable” and
have “differing perceptions regarding the scope of the debtor’s discharge”).
27. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a), (c) (2012) (emphasis added).
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Generally, a debtor under Chapter 11 is discharged of liability upon
confirmation of the plan of reorganization, 29 and any property dealt with
under the plan of reorganization, such as a lien, 30 is cleansed of claims and
interests and may no longer be pursued by creditors. 31 As a result, the
process tends to be pro-debtor, or debtor-friendly, 32 consistent with
Congress’s intent. 33 But the Bankruptcy Code also protects creditors and
their interests 34 and requires that reorganization plans detail how claims will
be handled going forward. 35 The plans may “contain only provisions that
are consistent with the interests of creditors and equity security holders and
with public policy.” 36 To minimize harm to creditors and to provide
creditors with a voice during this process, debtors are required to provide
creditors with notice 37 and court-approved disclosure statements containing
sufficient information. 38
The requirement of effective notice, “the life blood” 39 of bankruptcy
law, codifies creditors’ interests to be heard on issues related to the
29. Id. § 1141(d)(1) (“[T]he confirmation of a plan—(A) discharges the debtor from any debt
that arose before the date of such confirmation . . . and (B) terminates all rights and interests of
equity security holders and general partners provided for by the plan.”).
30. “[L]iens constitute one of the interests that section 1141(c) extinguishes . . . .” Elixir
Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817, 823 (5th Cir.
2007).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c). Under § 1141(c), any property “dealt with” by the plan after
confirmation is considered “free and clear of all claims and interests.” Id.
32. “[M]any bankruptcy courts view their primary job as facilitating the debtor’s successful
reorganization, thereby maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate and the recovery of general
unsecured creditors. Those are unquestionably key bankruptcy goals.” Craig Goldblatt et al.,
“Debtor-Friendly” Bankruptcy Courts and the Secondary Loan Market: Will the Supreme Court
Change the Dynamic?, in LSTA LOAN MARKET CHRONICLE 134, 134–35 (2012), available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Publicati
on/2012%20Chron%2021.pdf.
33. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
34. “[T]he Bankruptcy Code consciously balances those goals [of successful reorganization]
against countervailing concern of providing appropriate protections for secured creditors.”
Goldblatt et al., supra note 32, at 135.
35. Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx
(last
visited Apr. 11, 2014) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1123).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(7).
37. Id. § 1125. Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(the BAPCPA), debtors now face stricter notice requirements pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 342. New
Notice
Requirements,
AM.
BANKR.
INST.,
http://www.abiworld.org/webinars
/consumerbankruptcyi/code/newnoticerequirements.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). Amending a
previously nondescript requirement for notice, the BAPCPA now outlines in greater detail what
constitutes effective notice. Id.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (“[T]here is transmitted to such holder the plan or a summary of the
plan, and a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a hearing, by the court as
containing adequate information . . . .”).
39. Ben Feder, “I’ll Sit This One Out”—Fifth Circuit Permits Secured Creditor to Disregard
Chapter 11 Case, BANKR. L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.bankruptcylawinsights.com
/2013/08/ill-sit-this-one-out-fifth-circuit-permits-secured-creditor-to-disregard-chapter-11-case/
(“Notice to creditors and interested parties is the life blood of bankruptcy practice, particularly
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treatment of their claims. 40 As the debtor in possession or trustee negotiates
and structures a business reorganization, “[h]older[s] of a claim or interest”
on notice are given the opportunity to reject or accept the proposed plan. 41
Following a confirmation hearing and order, the plan of reorganization is
binding on the debtor and all parties in interest, whether or not creditors
have accepted the plan, 42 on the theory that creditors of known claims have
been given an opportunity for fair treatment and should not be permitted to
unduly burden debtors who have attempted to resolve lingering issues. 43
Therefore, in the interests of fairness and rehabilitation, confirmation frees
debtors from creditors’ interests and imports a res judicata effect on
“property dealt with by the plan.” 44 However, confirmation of a
reorganization plan under common law has been criticized as “provid[ing]
the parties with a bundle of rights which are subject to substantial change
for a bewildering number of reasons.” 45
B. EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION: THE COMMON LAW
Prior to its opinion in In re S. White Transportation, under the guidance
and “sound reasoning” of the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits,
the Fifth Circuit adopted the “default rule that a confirmed Chapter 11 plan
may avoid liens not specifically preserved” 46 and delineated the criteria for
extinguishing a lien under § 1141(c). 47 The court set forth in In re Ahern
Enterprises, Inc. that to extinguish a lien under § 1141(c), 48 “[f]our
conditions must therefore be met . . . : (1) the plan must be confirmed; (2)
the property that is subject to the lien must be dealt with by the plan; 49 (3)
the lien holder must participate in the reorganization; and (4) the plan must
not preserve the lien.” 50
chapter 11 cases where thousands of claims must be definitively resolved in order for a debtor to
reorganize successfully.”). Some, however, contend that we should get rid of the notice
requirement altogether. See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 2, at 1231 n.67.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 342 (requiring notice); id. § 1109(b) (giving creditors the right to be heard).
41. Id. § 1126. Claims that are “secured by a lien on property” are secured claims. Id. §§ 506,
1128.
42. Id. § 1141(a).
43. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c); see also Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 456.
45. Avery, supra note 3, at 305.
46. Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817, 822
(5th Cir. 2007).
47. Id.
48. Section 1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, with exceptions, “after
confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and
interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(c).
49. Courts are divided on interpretations of the understanding of “dealt with.” Depending on
what they emphasize—for example, failing to deal with or provide for liens in a plan of
reorganization—courts may be more or less likely to extinguish liens upon confirmation.
Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 456.
50. In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 822.
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1. Before In re S. White Transportation: In re Penrod
To extinguish a claim under § 1141(c), the Seventh Circuit first held in
In re Penrod 51 that a secured creditor’s lien is discharged upon
confirmation, provided the creditor has participated by filing a proof of
claim and the debtor’s reorganization plan includes a provision addressing
the lien. 52 At issue for the Seventh Circuit was a plan of reorganization that
provided for payment of a claim but did not indicate whether the creditor
still maintained its security interest. 53 The debtors, John and Alyce Penrod,
were hog farmers by trade. 54 Secured creditor Mutual Guaranty Corporation
(Mutual Guaranty) held a promissory note secured by the Penrods’ hogs. 55
The debtors’ plan provided for monthly payments of Mutual Guaranty’s
claim. 56 However, when the hogs fell sick after the plan had taken effect,
the Penrods sold the animals and retained the proceeds. 57 In response,
Mutual Guaranty filed suit against the Penrods to enforce its lien and
recover the sale proceeds. 58
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court holding that Mutual
Guaranty’s lien had been extinguished and enjoined, rejecting the
interpretation that a plan could expressly deal with a secured creditor’s
property claim and not a creditor’s interest or lien in the claim as
inconsistent with the reading of § 1141(c). 59 The court was concerned that
to hold otherwise, a reorganized entity “would continue to be burdened by
secured creditors’ claims by virtue of their liens, even if the plan made
provision for those claims.” 60 Thus, even when a plan did not expressly
provide for a lien attached to property addressed in the plan, the Seventh
Circuit held that the lien was extinguished following confirmation—
provided that the lienholder participated in the reorganization. 61
Following the In re Penrod opinion, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have also applied the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of § 1141(c). 62 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 461–62.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461, 464.
Id. at 463.
Id.
Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817, 821
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463); Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys.,
Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d
at 463); Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Tex., Inc. (In re Barton Indus., Inc.), 104
F.3d 1241, 1245 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462–64); FDIC v. Be-Mac
Transp. Co. (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.) 83 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing In re
Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462–63).
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principles from In re Penrod, recognized that confirmation of a
reorganization plan only extinguished liens that were dealt with and held by
participating creditors. 63 Finding for the secured creditor in In re Be-Mac
Transport, the Eighth Circuit determined that where a secured creditor was
inappropriately denied an opportunity to participate in the reorganization,
any lien held by that creditor survived the proceedings and was not
extinguished by confirmation of the plan. 64 The secured creditor, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC), had filed and amended
its proof of claim in the Chapter 11 reorganization of Be-Mac Transport
Company. 65 The bankruptcy court, however, erroneously disallowed the
FDIC’s amended claim and treated the claim as if it were never made. 66 The
Eighth Circuit recognized that such treatment denied the FDIC its right to
participate in “the reorganization for purposes of voting and distribution,”
effectively abrogating a creditor’s voice and interest in contravention to the
Bankruptcy Code’s want for balanced interests. 67
Citing In re Be-Mac Transport, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
In re Barton Industries 68 reiterated that confirmation of a Chapter 11
bankruptcy plan may extinguish a lien but noted that confirmation was
subject to appropriate notice under §§ 102(1) and 1128(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 69 Effective notice is required in the analysis and
consideration of whether a creditor’s interest was extinguished upon
confirmation. 70 Creditors must receive notice of the treatment of their
claims and have both an opportunity and sufficient information to make
informed decisions about the reorganization plan. 71 In the case of In re
Barton Industries, creditors who received notice were not given sufficient
information to adequately make a decision regarding their interest.
Therefore, because the notice provided did not contain sufficient
information, the creditors were not subject to the reorganization plan, and
their interests were not extinguished.72
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, noting “every other circuit court
of appeals to have addressed this issue has reached the same conclusion,” 73
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Tex., Inc. (In re Barton Indus., Inc.), 104 F.3d
1241 (10th Cir. 1997).
69. Id. at 1245.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1246.
73. Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d
528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing In re Barton Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1246; FDIC v. Be-Mac
Transp. Co. (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Penrod, 50
F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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also held the plain meaning of § 1141(c) implicated that liens are not
preserved following confirmation of the plan of reorganization, and the
Fourth Circuit would not excuse a creditor that failed to make a timely
objection. 74 In In re Regional Building Systems, the Fourth Circuit found
the creditor was notified of the Chapter 11 petition, actively participated in
the proceedings, and had time to object to the plan of reorganization. 75 And
yet, the creditor “fell asleep at the switch” and made no objections prior to
plan confirmation.76 “Having done so,” according to the Fourth Circuit, “it
cannot escape the consequences of its inaction,” and the court affirmed the
district court’s decision to extinguish the creditor’s lien. 77
Under the guidance and “sound reasoning” of the Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit first examined the issue of §
1141(c)’s participation requirement in In re Ahern Enterprises. The creditor
of In re Ahern Enterprises, Elixir Industries, Inc. (Elixir), submitted a proof
of claim in the Chapter 11 reorganization of Ahern Enterprises, Inc.
(Ahern). 78 The bankruptcy court confirmed Ahern’s plan, which addressed
property attached to Elixir’s lien and did not specifically preserve the lien. 79
Under the Bankruptcy Code, Elixir’s claim was extinguished upon
confirmation. 80 Elixir, however, took issue with Ahern’s voluntary
conversion from Chapter 11 reorganization to Chapter 7 liquidation. 81 Elixir
challenged the discharge of its lien because it contended the plan had not
been substantially consummated and was not void upon confirmation of the
Chapter 11 plan. 82 Despite Elixir’s protests, the Fifth Circuit adopted and
applied a four-part test—finding the reorganization plan had been
confirmed, the property had been dealt with, the lien holder had
participated, and the plan had not preserved the lien.83 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit held, as other circuit courts have, that confirmation extinguished the
participating creditor’s lien. 84
The In re Ahern Enterprises opinion highlighted a point of ambiguity in
judicial interpretation that the Fifth Circuit would later revisit in In re S.
White Transportation. The Fifth Circuit noted that the requirement of
secured creditors to participate in Chapter 11 reorganization is a “judicial
gloss on section 1141(c).” 85 In other words, the court acknowledges that
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 254 F.3d at 533.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 819–20.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2012).
In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 819.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 822–24.
Id.
Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
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there is no statutory requirement of participation in the plain reading of
§ 1141(c). 86 Participation, the court explained, “ensures that the secured
creditor has notice of the plan and its potential effect on the creditor’s
lien,” 87 and in at least one instance of judicial interpretation, the only
participation deemed necessary was a creditor’s receipt of notice and
opportunity to object. 88 Although it determined that Elixir’s proof of claim
constituted a “sufficient level of participation,” 89 the court refrained from
adopting a standard or definition for understanding sufficiency of
participation.
Through its opinion in In re S. White Transportation, the Fifth Circuit
has implemented a vague standard of participation that deviates from
common-law analysis and the balance of interests. Creditors are essentially
permitted to fall “asleep at the switch” 90 and preserve their liens, even after
confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, because notice alone
under the Fifth Circuit is insufficient to meet the participation requirement
of the In re Ahern Enterprises test. 91
2. In re S. White Transportation: A Decade-Old Relationship
Beginning in 2004, Acceptance Loan Co. (Acceptance) became
involved in extensive litigation in state court surrounding the validity of its
security interest in an office building in Saucier, Mississippi (the
Mississippi Property), owned by S. White Transportation, Inc. (SWT). 92
Acceptance and SWT disputed whether the individuals signing two deeds
of trust in 2002 and 2004 93 had the authority to bind SWT, and if valid,
whether the deeds would validate Acceptance’s lien on the Mississippi
Property. 94 If the lien were valid, Acceptance would have first priority over
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2012).
87. In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 823.
88. Id. (citing Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.),

251 B.R. 274, 287 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000)).
89. Id. In a footnote, the court distinguished In re Be-Mac Transport Co., where the FDIC had
filed a proof of claim and attempted to file an amendment to the claim, but the Be-Mac court
ultimately held that plan confirmation did not void the FDIC’s lien. Id. at 823 n.4 (citing FDIC v.
Be-Mac Transp. Co. (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1996)). The BeMac court found that disallowing the amended claim had the effect of a creditor not filing a proof
of claim. In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d at 1027.
90. In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 254 F.3d at 533.
91. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d
494, 496 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The parties agree that the first, second, and fourth conditions of the In
re Ahern Enterprises test are met by the facts of this case; they only dispute whether Acceptance’s
passive receipt of notice constitutes participation within the meaning of this test.”).
92. Id. at 495.
93. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R.
695, 697 (S.D. Miss. 2012), rev’g In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
2011).
94. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 512 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d,
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D.
Miss. 2012).
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three other creditors that also had perfected security interests in the same
property. 95
Nearly six years later, on May 17, 2010, SWT voluntarily filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.96 The question of Acceptance’s lien on the
property still had not yet been settled at the time of filing. 97 In the
documentation accompanying the bankruptcy petition, SWT identified
Acceptance on Schedule D to the petition as a secured claim creditor and
noted Acceptance’s disputed interest over the Mississippi Property. 98
Effective notice of SWT’s ongoing bankruptcy was served on Acceptance
on several occasions, but Acceptance never got involved with the
proceedings and never filed a proof of claim. 99
On September 14, 2010, SWT submitted its reorganization plan (the
Plan) to the bankruptcy court and again noted that Acceptance’s lien was
contested and Acceptance had never filed a proof of claim. 100 The Plan
described Acceptance’s lien “as a disputed claim upon which no payment
would be made unless the Court ordered otherwise.” 101 A copy of the Plan
was provided to Acceptance, including a notice of the confirmation hearing,
at which Acceptance would have had an opportunity to make objections. 102
Despite receiving repeated notice of SWT’s bankruptcy and open challenge
of Acceptance’s claim, Acceptance remained silent and absent in the SWT
bankruptcy proceedings, “in stark contrast to its aforementioned litigation
activity against SWT in preceding years.” 103 The Plan was confirmed on
December 21, 2010. 104
Two weeks after the Plan was confirmed, Acceptance filed an adversary
proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi on January 4, 2011. 105 Acceptance moved the bankruptcy court
for a declaratory judgment stating that Acceptance’s lien survived
confirmation or, alternatively, that the confirmation order be amended and
provide for Acceptance’s lien on the Mississippi Property. 106
Acceptance argued that under In re Aherns Enterprises, 107 “lienholder
participation in the reorganization [is] a condition for avoiding a lien
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 495.
Id.
Id.
In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.
In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 495.
Id.
In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.
Id.
Id. Acceptance did not file a single document with the bankruptcy court, nor did it attend
the meeting of creditors for this matter. Id.
104. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496.
105. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.
106. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496.
107. Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817 (5th
Cir. 2007).
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through the Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation process.” 108 As Acceptance had
not filed a claim or participated in the proceedings, Acceptance contended
that it had not participated and, therefore, its lien should remain intact. 109
The bankruptcy court denied the motion on both accounts, finding that
effective notice sufficiently constituted participation and warranted lien
extinguishment. 110 The court determined that the Plan’s confirmation
voided Acceptance’s liens on the basis of 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c), 111 and
Acceptance did not qualify for modification.112 The decision was appealed
to the district court, which reversed and remanded, holding that
“[s]omething more [than notice] was required” to satisfy the participation
requirement. 113
SWT appealed the district court holding to the Fifth Circuit. 114
Reviewing the case de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, holding that Acceptance’s lien on the Mississippi Property
survived confirmation of the Plan, 115 and “passive receipt of effective
notice” did not constitute participation. 116
II. BREAKING DOWN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
A. THE COURT’S READING OF “PARTICIPATION” IN
REORGANIZATION DEVIATES FROM PRECEDENT
In preserving the creditor’s lien after confirmation, the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in In re S. White Transportation has added a new layer to the
analysis by requiring “more than mere passive receipt of effective notice” to
satisfy the participation requirement of In re Ahern Enterprises. 117 Liens, as
held in In re Ahern Enterprises and applied in In re S. White
Transportation, are void if four conditions are met: (1) the plan is
confirmed; (2) the property subject to the lien has been accounted for in the
reorganization plan; (3) the lien holder has participated in the
reorganization; and (4) the plan does not preserve the lien.118 The In re S.
108. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 514 (citing In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at

823).

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 523.
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R.
695, 703 (S.D. Miss. 2012), rev’g In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
2011).
114. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d
494, 496 (5th Cir. 2013).
115. Id. at 496, 498.
116. Id. at 498.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 496 (citing Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.),
507 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 2007)).
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White Transportation opinion hinges on the court’s understanding of
“participated,” in the context of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding.
Participation, as a “condition for avoiding a lien through the Chapter 11
Plan Confirmation process,” 119 is critical to the viability of a claim, and yet
the standards and understanding of “participation” were and still remain
ambiguous and vague.
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis characterizes the word “participation” as
“connot[ing] activity, and not mere nonfeasance.” 120 To support its
interpretation, the Fifth Circuit referred to Black’s Law Dictionary, which
defines “participation” as “[t]he act of taking part in something, such as a
partnership, a crime, or a trial.” 121 And yet, one could take part in a
partnership as a silent partner and satisfy the reading of “participation”
without actively managing the firm. 122 Silent partners—even undisclosed
partners that provide capital but do not interfere with management of the
partnership—are held liable for and bound to contracts that acting partners
have entered into for purposes of their business. 123 In a partnership, claims
against silent partners are not estopped by virtue of their inactivity. 124
The Fifth Circuit also referred to the Supreme Court’s opinion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 125 for the
distinction between “‘activity’ and a ‘decision not to do something’ or a
‘failure to do it,’” 126 but underlying the Court’s interpretation of
participation in the health care industry are fears and concerns not present in
the bankruptcy context, and bankruptcy notions of good faith and equity at
risk are not captured by the Court’s analysis. In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court held that the
individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act failed
under the Commerce Clause because congressional power to regulate
activity did not extend to inaction, or a person’s decision not to purchase
health care. 127 The Court was concerned about potential abuse if Congress
were authorized to use its commerce power to compel action—to compel
those who have chosen not to have health care to make such purchases—as

119. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 514 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d,
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D.
Miss. 2012) (citing In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 823).
120. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497.
121. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (9th ed. 2009)).
122. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 1230 (A “silent partner” is one “who
shares in the profits but who has no active voice in management of the firm and whose existence
is often not publicly disclosed.”).
123. 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 231 (2013).
124. Id.
125. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
126. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d
494, 497 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587).
127. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
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part of its regulation of activity. 128 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that
only individuals who purchased health care were under the purview of the
Commerce Clause and said to have participated in the health care
industry. 129
In the context of Chapter 11 reorganization, these concerns of abuse of
power by authority or inappropriate compulsion of action—that shape the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of participation—are simply not present.
Chapter 11 reorganization seeks to balance two underlying concerns (or
competing interests) that serve as the bedrock principles of bankruptcy: the
debtor’s right to a “fresh start” and the creditors’ right to recovery and
protection of their claims. 130 Creditors under the Bankruptcy Code have
always been required to act diligently; “creditors who acted with the most
speed and diligence would be paid, and the other creditors would be left
out.” 131 Those that do not act diligently to perfect their security interests by
the time bankruptcy commences are subject to avoidance by the trustee’s
strong-arm powers, even if it gives a debtor’s other creditors a “‘windfall’
cash infusion” and appears inequitable. 132 This is the nature of bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Code’s pressure on creditors to act diligently is
tempered by the recognition that modification of liens under Chapter 11
reorganization invokes the need for “constitutional due process
protection.” 133 Liens concern property rights protected under the Fifth
Amendment. 134 As set forth by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. 135 and its progeny, the protection of due process takes the form of
adequate notices and opportunities to be heard: “An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 136 The Mullane

128. Id. at 2588. The Supreme Court observed by analogy that with such a power, “Congress
could address the diet problem by ordering everyone to buy vegetables.” Id.
129. Id. at 2591.
130. NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 717 (1997),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/17bjuris.pdf.
131. 1 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY LAW § 5:1 (2013).
132. Lack of Diligence Precluded Equitable Argument, WEST’S BANKR. NEWSL., Jan. 31, 2007,
at 6.
133. Richards, supra note 16, at 45–46 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the laws
passed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause are subject to the requirements of due process.”); see
also Avery, supra note 3, at 264 (highlighting the debate over the necessity for constitutional due
process protection).
134. See In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Security Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76–77 (1982)) (asserting that a lien is property under the protection of the
Fifth Amendment).
135. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
136. Id.
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standard has been applied in the bankruptcy context 137 and is incorporated
in the Federal Rules. 138 Sufficient notice is flexible and its form depends on
context, 139 but at minimum it must be intelligible for an unsophisticated
creditor and “more than mere ‘boilerplate,’” 140 containing
at least some explicit and conspicuous information to alert the creditor
. . . . At a minimum, the notice of hearing should direct the creditor to the
pertinent part of the proposed plan which prescribes the treatment of the
creditor’s lien.
....
. . . [T]he fundamental principles of due process require that the notice be
sufficiently detailed to alert even an unsophisticated creditor that its lien
rights are in jeopardy if it fails to object to the proposed plan of
141
reorganization.

Under these standards, the Federal Rules ensure that all creditors—
particularly unsophisticated creditors—are put on notice that their interests
are affected and require action before liens are modified or extinguished
through reorganization. To ensure that creditors have actually received
notice, courts look for evidence of participation. 142 It is undisputed that
SWT gave Acceptance effective and repeated notice of the ongoing
bankruptcy proceedings. 143 The bankruptcy court determined SWT’s notice
satisfied due process requirements—enough to inform even an
unsophisticated creditor—and was all that was required under In re Ahern’s
“participation analysis.” 144 The bankruptcy court’s reading is consistent
with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re Ahern Enterprises. There, the Fifth
Circuit noted, without comment, that “[a]t least one bankruptcy court [in the
137. City of New York v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); see
also Avery, supra note 3, at 269 (“The Chapter 11 case law is becoming more uniform along the
lines set down by the Mullane-City of New York precedent . . . .”).
138. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017.1.
139. Lawless, supra note 2, at 1231 & n.69 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) (“It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority
that due process is flexible.”)); Richards, supra note 16, at 104–05 (outlining notice requirements).
140. Richards, supra note 16, at 105 (citing Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 93 (4th Cir.
1995) (“We do not think, however, that the Hansons’ inclusion of this boilerplate language in the
plan avoided the liens . . . .”); 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 95:5, at 137 (2d ed. Supp. 1997) (“To allow the discharge of a creditor’s property
interest through ‘boilerplate’ language in a plan without serving notice of the debtor’s intention is
contrary to the due process protections under the Fifth Amendment.”)).
141. Richards, supra note 16, at 105 (emphasis added).
142. See Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817,
823 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that the requirement of creditor participation is meant to ensure that
creditors have been given notice of the plan and the possibility of it affecting their property).
143. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 519 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d,
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D.
Miss. 2012).
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Fourth Circuit] ha[d] stated that the only participation necessary is that the
creditor receive notice of the plan and an opportunity to object.” 145
Nearly six years later, the Fifth Circuit now qualifies its silent
acquiescence to the idea that notice was sufficient to constitute
participation. 146 In support, the Fifth Circuit cites two circuit court
opinions—In re Penrod and In re Be-Mac Transport—“addressing similar
issues [that] have required more than notice.” 147 To be precise, the Seventh
Circuit in In re Penrod hardly required more than notice. It merely stated
that a creditor who filed a claim was subject to lien extinction, providing no
further analysis on what constituted participation. 148 The Fifth Circuit noted
that the secured creditor in In re Be-Mac Transport—the FDIC—was
permitted to maintain its claim after confirmation because not only had the
creditor received effective notice, but it was also actively involved. 149 The
Fifth Circuit’s emphasis on the FDIC’s active participation is misleading.
The Eighth Circuit opinion’s recitation of the facts makes no mention of
effective notice. 150 The question for the Eighth Circuit court was whether
the FDIC’s claim was erroneously denied by the bankruptcy court and
subsequently impeded the FDIC’s participation in the reorganization. 151
After all, the purpose of giving notice is to ensure that creditors are given an
unimpeded, unobstructed opportunity to protect their interests; otherwise,
notice would be nothing more than an empty promise. When rights to
participate were abrogated, the Eighth Circuit appropriately ruled that
judicial error should not bar the creditor’s claim. 152 Still, neither the
Seventh nor Eighth Circuit can be said to have required more than effective
notice.
In addition, the court remarked that it was “unable to find any case
voiding a lien in the face of no involvement by a secured creditor other than

145. In re Ahern Enters., Inc., 507 F.3d at 823 (citing Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg.
Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 251 B.R. 274, 287 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000)).
146. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d
494, 497 (5th Cir. 2013) The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that notice was sufficient to constitute
participation under the Fourth Circuit but stated that the facts leading up to the circuit court’s
ruling indicated that more than notice was necessary. Id. (citing In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 251
B.R. at 286–87).
147. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497.
148. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have concluded that the default rule
for secured creditors who file claims for which provision is made in the plan of reorganization is
extinction and is found in the [Bankruptcy] Code itself.”).
149. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497 (citing FDIC v. Be-Mac Transp. Co. (In re
Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1996)).
150. In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., 83 F.3d at 1022.
151. Id. at 1027 (holding “[a]ny lien held by the FDIC should have survived the bankruptcy
proceedings . . . because the bankruptcy court did not determine the lien’s validity before
disallowing the claim and it improperly confirmed a plan extinguishing the FDIC’s lien without
permitting the FDIC to participate in the reorganization as a secured creditor”).
152. Id.
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the passive receipt of notice” 153 and dismissed debtor SWT’s argument that
the Supreme Court’s decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa
weighed in its favor. 154 In Espinosa, the Court held that where a student
loan creditor “received actual notice of the filing and contents of [a
debtor’s] Chapter 13 plan,” there was no violation of the creditor’s due
process rights by the bankruptcy court in confirming the debtor’s plan. 155
The Espinosa Court further posited that the creditor having “been afforded
a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” “could have timely objected” to seek
relief. 156 In fact, creditors did not have a “license . . . to sleep on their
rights.” 157 As a threshold matter, the creditor filed a proof of claim during
the pendency of the proceedings but made no objections until after the
plan’s confirmation, and therefore under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, the
creditor participated and was subject to the plan. 158 Although the Fifth
Circuit dismisses Espinosa as “wholly inapposite” and limited to due
process under Rule 60(b)(4), 159 the Espinosa Court’s emphasis on fair
treatment of litigants and the importance of finality is far from irrelevant:
Rule 60(b)(4) [which provides relief from judgment] strikes a balance
between the need for finality of judgments and the importance of ensuring
that litigants have a full and fair opportunity to litigate a dispute. Where
. . . a party is notified of a plan’s contents and fails to object to
confirmation of the plan before the time for appeal expires, that party has
been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and the party’s failure
160
to avail itself of that opportunity will not justify . . . relief.

Yet, on the basis of its interpretation of these cases, the Fifth Circuit
indicates that creditors are entitled to more than due process and leaves
open the question of precisely what is sufficient protection. The Fifth
Circuit distinguished between “active” and “mere passive receipt of
effective notice,” 161 creating a spectrum between doing nothing and filing a
claim, where due process has always been met by providing mere notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Requiring greater protection than what is
constitutionally necessary for parallel non-bankruptcy contexts
demonstrates misplaced fear. Creditors such as Acceptance are protected
when they are notified of the potential risk to their claims, how and when
their claims will be modified, and when and where they have an opportunity

153. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497.
154. In a footnote, the court dismissed the case as inapposite because the instant case did not

“implicate due process under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 497 n.1.
155. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010).
156. Id. at 272, 275.
157. Id. at 275.
158. Id. at 276.
159. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 497 n.1.
160. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276.
161. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d. at 498.
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to be heard on their claims 162 Particularly in reorganization proceedings that
span several months, such as In re S. White Transportation, the fear is
utterly misplaced for the sophisticated creditor.
B. THE COURT’S HOLDING OVERLOOKS THAT ACCEPTANCE IS A
SOPHISTICATED CREDITOR
In reading the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, it is important to bear in mind
two troubling facts that undercut Acceptance’s position and demonstrate
that the reorganization process has been needlessly undermined. First,
Acceptance and SWT developed a relationship as early as 2002 and
engaged in communication and litigation over Acceptance’s security
interest for several years leading up to SWT’s bankruptcy petition. 163
Second, Acceptance had repeatedly received effective notice challenging
the very interest being litigated, 164 and according to its counsel, “‘in fact
they were ignored’ due to ‘inadvertence and oversight.’” 165 Acceptance is
far from the ordinary creditor. It had competent counsel. 166 It was
considerably more sophisticated than the average flesh-and-blood investor.
Rather than protecting its interest reasonably upon notice, Acceptance, by
sheer “inadvertence and oversight,” sat idly for months as SWT proceeded
through Chapter 11 reorganization. 167 Acceptance failed to act diligently,
and it then contended, only after confirmation of the Plan, that its lien
should have survived the Plan or the confirmed Plan should have been
amended to provide for its lien.168 It “fell asleep at the switch.” 169
The purpose of reorganizing a company is “not a lawsuit in the ordinary
sense . . . , but a complex exercise of legal method, corporate finance and
business management,” 170 and the process of negotiating a plan of
reorganization can take several months 171 and potentially continue for

162. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509, 519 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011), rev’d,
Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White. Transp., Inc., (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D.
Miss. 2012).
163. See supra Part I.B.2.
164. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. at 513.
165. Id. at 523.
166. Id. at 512.
167. Id. at 523.
168. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d
494, 495–96 (5th Cir. 2013).
169. Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d
528, 533 (4th Cir. 2001).
170. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2013).
171. Section 1121 provides that a debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization
for 120 days, a period the court may extend, but not to exceed eighteen months. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121(b), (d) (2012). If a debtor fails to file a plan of reorganization during the exclusivity
period, any party in interest, with the exception of the U.S. trustee, may file a plan of
reorganization. Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 35 (citing 11
U.S.C. § 307).
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years. 172 It is essential, then, to devise a timely remedy. 173 Debtors are
encouraged to file Chapter 11 petitions when “they can still realistically be
organized,” 174 can continue to operate, 175 and can be “returned to a viable
state.” 176 Timely remedies mutually benefit and balance the interests of the
debtor and its creditors. 177 The Bankruptcy Code provides tools to
safeguard the interests of debtors and creditors alike, but with the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion, we have effectively allowed creditors to circumvent
protections afforded to debtors seeking reorganization—seeking a “fresh”
start.
Creditors “have a responsibility to take an active role in protecting their
claims,” 178 and as previously discussed, secured creditors that fail to act
diligently are not cosseted and stand to lose priority to unsecured
creditors. 179 Chapter 11 debtors may have many—even thousands of—
claimants, which puts creditors in the best position to prove and maintain
their security interests and to decide whether they wish to pursue those
interests. Provided that debtors have delivered adequate information for
consideration, creditors must diligently assess notices to protect their
claims. 180 Yet under In re S. White Transportation, creditors—with claims
that the debtor is fully aware of and ready to address—are encouraged to
take a “wait-and-see” posture. 181 Under the new Fifth Circuit analysis,
creditors that receive effective notice have not yet met the participation
requirement under In re Ahern Enterprises that would extinguish their liens;
therefore, they need not act timely or diligently. 182 Neither acting timely nor
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 35.
See infra Part II.C.
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2013).
Id.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
Richards, supra note 16, at 108.
Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Tex., Inc. (In re Barton Indus., Inc.), 104 F.3d
1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Heins v. Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1265–67 (10th
Cir. 1988)).
179. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012) (trustees stand in the shoes of the perfect judgment lien
creditor and may avoid secured claims that are not perfected at the time of filing).
180. In re Barton Indus., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1246 (citing Turney v. FDIC, 18 F.3d 865 (10th Cir.
1994)). The In re Barton Industries court determined that notice received by the creditors was
defective for failure to include adequate information on the treatment of their claims. Therefore, it
did not constitute adequate notice of the plan, and the claims were not affected. Id. In re S. White
Transportation, however, involves a creditor that received notice with adequate information but
did not act diligently to protect its interests. In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496.
181. See In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496–97 (holding that nonfeasance does not
meet the In re Ahern Enterprises participation requirement for lien extinguishment); see also Dan
B. Prieto & Mark G. Douglas, Secured Creditor May Choose to Take No Action During Chapter
11 Case Without Hazarding Lien Stripping, 9 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 749, 754–55 (2013)
(discussing the In re S. White Transportation opinion as leaving open the possibility for debtors to
“wait in the wings during the case and proceed to exercise its remedies in a more favorable forum
after confirmation of a plan”).
182. See In re S. White Transp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 496–97; see also Prieto & Douglas, supra note
181, at 754–55.
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sitting idly would affect a creditor’s right to recovery. Such a result unfairly
tips the balance of interests and prioritizes creditors’ interests over that of
debtors.
Yet, should we hold sophisticated and unsophisticated creditors alike to
the same standard? A similar question has been drawn for institutional
investors who have fallen victim to Ponzi schemes. 183 Writing for the court
in SEC v. Nadel, Judge Richard Lazzara stated that the “investors [bore] the
burden of showing that ‘red flags’ were not ignored when they invested
their money in what is later realized as a Ponzi Scheme.” 184 The district
court denied the investors’ claim largely on the basis of their sophisticated
status 185 and lack of good faith. 186 The opinion suggests, as the receiver
Burton Wiand highlighted, “that sophisticated investors shouldn’t expect to
be treated like any other victim when they ‘make these investments without
the level of diligence that ought to be necessary.’” 187
Sophisticated investors are those individuals or entities that have the
expertise or access to resources and information that allow them to evaluate
their position and make educated decisions with respect to their
investments. 188 Congress has recognized that sophistication may merit a
different standard of consideration and has implemented regulations
reflecting such a notion in non-bankruptcy law contexts. 189 Congress and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have also adopted an
objective investor sophistication standard, which considers “financial
sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters,
or amount of assets under management.” 190 Consideration of the level of
sophistication is not new for the judiciary either. Courts have considered
party sophistication in various areas of law including tort, 191 contract, 192
183. Reed Albergotti, Should Savvy Investors Get Their Ponzi-Stolen Money Back?, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 30, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/08/30/should-savvy-investors-gettheir-ponzi-stolen-money-back/.
184. Order at 12, SEC v. Nadel, No. 8:09-cv-87-T-26TBM (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2013),
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flmdce/8:2009cv00087
/222528/1061/0.pdf.
185. Id. at 11.
186. Id. at 12–13.
187. Albergotti, supra note 183.
188. Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor,” 40
U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 243 (2010) (Sophisticated investors are considered to have “the
wherewithal to ‘fend for themselves.’”).
189. Id. at 243 (Congress has permitted a private offering disclosure exemption under the
premise that sophisticated investors involved in private offerings were of a class that would least
likely benefit from statutorily required disclosure.).
190. Id. at 250 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)(ii)).
191. William Jordan, Design Professionals May Be Liable to Third-Party Purchasers of
Residential Condominiums, PROF. LIABILITY REP., Jan. 2013 (describing “sophisticated investors
or creditors who can control their risks through their contracts and insurance coverage”).
192. Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO.
L. REV. 493, 495–96 nn.15–17 (2010) (citing Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc.,
59 S.W.3d 505, 508 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted) (“Sophisticated parties have freedom
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and bankruptcy law. 193 Bankruptcy courts—and notably, even the Fifth
Circuit—have examined creditor sophistication to determine whether
creditors were at fault for delays in bringing claims. 194 In reviewing the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy case In re Royale Airlines, the Fifth Circuit advanced
consideration of creditor sophistication as a reason to preclude a creditor’s
claim. 195 The court determined that the “legally sophisticated creditor,” 196
who was under advisement of counsel and extensively involved throughout
the bankruptcy proceedings, impermissibly waited to file a complaint after
the bankruptcy proceedings closed. 197 The court pointed out that the
creditor was aware of the bankruptcy issues yet neither expressed concern
nor sought removal of the trustee during the proceedings. 198 The In re
Royale Airlines opinion is in line with the Fifth Circuit’s current
participation requirement—extensive involvement and control precluded
the creditor’s claim.
Regardless of whether the creditor was extensively involved, the In re
Royale Airlines court also raised an issue that should not be overlooked:
It is well recognized that where a party is found to have by their conduct,
either expressly or impliedly, consented to another party’s action, they are
precluded from asserting a claim against that party for damages they may
have suffered. “[A] secured creditor cannot remain silent with knowledge
of the Trustee’s actions and not act upon it and then be heard that the
199
Trustee made the wrong decision.”

of contract—even to make a bad bargain, or to relinquish fundamental rights.”); Oppenheimer &
Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y. 1995)) (“If [sophisticated
parties] are dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to say so [was] at the
bargaining table.’”); 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.38 (2013) (“The more sophisticated the party,
the greater the burden to read.”)).
193. See 9B AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1960 (2013) (citing cases where bankruptcy courts have
highlighted a creditor’s sophistication or advisement under counsel in finding the creditor liable
for violations of the automatic stay); see also 2B BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 19:1364 (2013) (citing
cases that use a factor test in determining punitive damages for violations of the automatic stay,
including consideration of creditor sophistication by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit).
194. Clark v. Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 190 B.R. 260, 268 n.20 (E.D. La. 1995) (internal
citations omitted) (“Sophistication in bankruptcy was considered by the Sixth Circuit in
determining whether the notice to creditors sent in that case was sufficient and whether an
attorney’s neglect could be visited on his clients. Other courts . . . have also considered the
sophistication of creditors in determining the ‘fault’ of a creditor as to the reason for delay in not
filing a proof of claim, whether the delay was in the creditor’s control and whether the creditor
acted in bad faith[, and t]hus, the Court questions whether [plaintiffs] have ‘unclean hands’ as to
knowledge of bankruptcy procedure.”).
195. Howard v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. (In re Royale Airlines, Inc.), 98 F.3d 852, 857
(5th Cir. 1996).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Peckinpaugh, 50 B.R. 865, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985)).
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The court found that the creditor, having full knowledge of the
proceedings and failing to take certain corrective actions, “implicitly
consented to the actions or inactions” of the trustee. 200 The In re Royale
Airlines court recognized that a sophisticated creditor’s silence can function
as implicit consent, and the sophisticated creditor is no longer permitted to
object after the conclusion of the case.201 Regardless of consent, the court
implicitly recognized that the creditor must have known during the
pendency of the proceedings if it had any objections and should have
addressed the issues prior to confirmation. Arguably, the reading of implicit
consent could be limited to situations in which a creditor has been involved
in all respects of the bankruptcy proceeding but failed to contest a specific
issue—now said to have been implicitly consented to. However, the court
does not appear to take such a restrictive view and addresses secured
creditors with knowledge generally. 202 Accordingly, a sophisticated creditor
that has received effective notice yet remained silent and failed to act
despite knowledge of debtors’ actions cannot now be heard to say “that the
Trustee made the wrong decision.” 203
C. THE COURT’S AMBIGUOUS STANDARD IS NOT
ECONOMICALLY VIABLE
“It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate,
because it preserves jobs and assets.” 204 Economic efficiency is at the heart
of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, but the costs of bankruptcy
proceedings in conjunction with the present opinion chip away at the core
purpose of providing debtors with a socially and economically beneficial
fresh start. 205 When debtors voluntarily file for bankruptcy, creditors are
unwillingly drawn into proceedings and stand to lose that for which they
bargained. The Bankruptcy Code is aware of the risk and, together with the
Federal Rules, provides mechanisms for protecting creditor rights and
balancing their interests fairly. However, the Fifth Circuit has effectively
permitted creditors to draw out proceedings and forced debtors to take
every precautionary measure, including those that are not particularly
necessary. “The adverse impact on the creditor’s property rights must be
weighed against the administrative costs associated with additional judicial
procedures.” 206
The In re S. White Transportation opinion imposes additional costs and
burdens on an already time-consuming and costly proceeding. Bankruptcy
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting In re Peckinpaugh, 50 B.R. at 869).
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 461–62.
Richards, supra note 16, at 106.
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involves direct costs from participating in formal proceedings and indirect
costs that stem from formal bankruptcy proceedings. 207 Direct costs are
transactional costs such as “the legal administrative and advisory fees that
the firm bears as a direct result of entertaining the formal bankruptcy
process.” 208 Fees are required to commence and to continue with
proceedings. 209 Specifically, debtors in possession must pay quarterly fees
to trustees handling the case ranging from $325 to $30,000 per quarter. 210
Generally, indirect costs are presumed to be “substantially larger” than
direct costs and are the consequences of: “inter- or intra-group conflicts of
interest, asymmetric information, free-rider problems, lost sales and
competitive position, higher operating costs, and ineffective use of
management’s time.” 211
As a consequence of these costs, the question is raised as to the
effectiveness of Chapter 11 when “high costs drain troubled firms of
resources.” 212 In evaluating the efficiency of reorganization, one critic,
recognizing the diminishing value of a failing business over time, suggests
selling companies if a plan were not adopted “by the end of the initial
exclusivity period, which is 180 days if managers propose a plan or 120
days if they do not.” 213 Although two critics find that the correlation
between costs and time in bankruptcy is weak, their research has shown that
for every year a Chapter 11 proceeding endures, “the total costs of the
proceedings consume another 2.1% to 2.2% of the total distributions in the
case”—approximately half the costs of the median Chapter 11. 214 Costs
deemed administrative expenses take priority and reduce creditors’
recovery. 215
Holding sophisticated creditors to a different standard has important
policy considerations. When creditors have knowledge and the resources to
navigate proceedings, the In re Royale Airlines court compels these

207. Lemma W. Senbet & James K. Seward, Financial Distress, Bankruptcy and
Reorganization, in HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 944–45
(R. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (“In principle, bankruptcy costs matter because they impose dead
weight costs on the firm which are borne by the shareholders through an ex ante compensation to
the creditors for the possibility of incurring these costs ex post . . . . To the extent that the
bankruptcy process itself is costly, and if these costs are not avoidable, then capital structure
decisions will be affected.”).
208. Id. at 944.
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2012).
210. Id. § 1930(a)(6).
211. Senbet & Seward, supra note 207, at 945.
212. Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11
Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 268, 268 (1994).
213. Id. at 293–94.
214. Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct
Costs of Chapter 11, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629, 657 (2000).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
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sophisticated creditors to act sooner rather than later. 216 Such a standard
intends to discourage inaction and deny incentives to those acting in bad
faith. All creditors are subjected to human biases that affect decisionmaking, but sophisticated creditors have the distinct advantages of expertise
and superior resources that allow them to facilitate efficiency and prevent
bankruptcy proceedings from becoming needlessly burdensome. 217 The
burden on debtors to challenge and discern the extent of their liability for
each claim through adversary proceedings, for instance, is unduly taxing
and costly. 218 Drawing problems to light as sophisticated creditors become
aware saves parties from the time and costs spent negotiating and
renegotiating terms in what is already a time-consuming process. Efforts
and expenses are better redirected towards effective reorganization to the
benefit of diligent creditors and the public good.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Under the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, can it still be said that it is more
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate? Confirmation after In re S. White
Transportation becomes almost meaningless if negligent creditors are
allowed to spring awake and strip debtors of finality. Courts certainly have
good reason to protect creditors—especially those who are not adequately
equipped to protect themselves. 219 But by extending similar latitude to
sophisticated creditors, the Fifth Circuit allows secured creditors to remain
silent and bring their claims whenever they are unsatisfied. Yet, how can a
plan ever comport with a creditor’s expectation if the debtor never receives
a response? A solution is needed.
Perhaps the only foolproof option a debtor presently has to avoid future
harassment is to bring adversary proceedings to preclude future attempts to
enforce claims. However, such proceedings are costly and burdensome for
both the debtor and the court. 220 Additionally, if the creditor is not
interested in pursuing its claim, debtors’ proceedings are extraneous and not
216. Howard v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. (In re Royale Airlines, Inc.), 98 F.3d 852, 857
(5th Cir. 1996).
217. Smith, supra note 188, at 262–67 (discussing factors affecting decision-making that may
explain why sophisticated investors fell for Madoff’s Ponzi scheme).
218. Richards, supra note 16, at 106.
219. Id. at 105 (indicating that due process requires notice that at minimum can be understood
by an unsophisticated creditor because claim modifications affect property rights.); see also
Buchanan Staudenmaier, supra note 20, at 465 (remarking on courts’ concerns over inadequate
protection of creditors’ rights where interests may not be fairly balanced).
220. Feder, supra note 39 (“A requirement that the mere provision of notice to such creditors
can no longer suffice to address such liens would place a huge and costly burden on chapter 11
debtors to effectuate the ‘participation’ of passive creditors in their cases, such as by utilizing
Section 501(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to file proofs of claim on such creditors’ behalf.”); see
also Prieto & Douglas, supra note 181, at 754–55 (discussing the In re S. White Transportation
opinion as leaving open the possibility for debtors to “wait in the wings during the case and
proceed to exercise its remedies in a more favorable forum after confirmation of a plan”).
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cost-effective. Still, it remains a necessary, prophylactic measure for the
debtor under the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. One scholar has advanced the idea
of a Restatement of Notice so as to better delineate expectations and guide
judicial interpretation, 221 but such a restatement of the law would not
adequately address concerns of equitable treatment for creditors’ rights that
underlie the Fifth Circuit’s want for “something more.”
In light of the room for abuse by creditors and risk to debtors, the Fifth
Circuit’s standard for something more than notice must be tempered with a
heightened standard of scrutiny for sophisticated creditors. Already, the
Bankruptcy Code makes a distinction between individual and business
debtors in definition and treatment, 222 and it would not be far off for
Congress to implement a statutory creditor distinction or for courts to hold
sophisticated creditors to greater scrutiny. In cases where a statutory or
common-law sophisticated creditor has received effective notice, the
creditor should be presumed to have participated in the reorganization
proceedings, or alternatively, debtors should be permitted to raise a
sophisticated creditor defense.
Ultimately, the lack of response from sophisticated creditors who
actually receive notice will amount to those who choose not to pursue their
interests and those creditors, like Acceptance, who choose not to act until
an opportune time. By holding sophisticated creditors to a higher standard
of review, creditors like Acceptance are prevented from taking advantage of
the reorganization process, and costs of litigation are saved. Admittedly,
holding sophisticated creditors to a different standard operates on a
presumption that sophistication allows for exercise of good judgment.
Recent events rebut the presumption; in fact, the great losses stemming
from Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme were largely on account of
sophisticated investors’ failure to conduct due diligence. 223 However,
sophisticated creditors dragged into bankruptcy do not face the temptation
of indolence induced by the glamor of a “marquee name” like Madoff. 224
Creditors do not stand to profit from bankruptcy and are subject to priority
rules. 225 They can only expect to have claims fulfilled as to what they
bargained for or run the risk of losing their interests altogether. 226
221. Lawless, supra note 2, at 1250.
222. Although the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “debtor” to include individuals and

business entities, the Code specifies who may be considered a debtor under each chapter. 11
U.S.C. §§ 101, 109 (2012). Additionally, even within the provisions governing Chapter 11,
distinctions are made between individuals and business entities. See, e.g., id. § 1141(d)(5)
(specifically referring to individuals).
223. See Smith, supra note 188, at 253–60.
224. Id. at 264.
225. 11. U.S.C. § 507 (outlining the priorities of expenses and claims in bankruptcy
proceedings and indicating that secured creditors do not receive a payment from the estate until
other claims and expenses have first been accounted for).
226. In line with statutory priorities delineated in § 507, plans under Chapter 11 must be “fair
and equitable” in the treatment of claims in order to be confirmed. Id. § 1129. Treatment is fair
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Undoubtedly, sophisticated investors and creditors alike are still prone to
error on account of human biases and, as in the case of In re S. White
Transportation, poor counsel. In recognition of these lapses, court-approved
notice of all relevant proceedings must be given, 227 but following notice to
sophisticated creditors, there should be no further obligation by the debtor
to induce action or do more. The onus is on these creditors to act diligently.
Creditors that fail to act diligently under the advice of counsel should bring
a separate cause of action, where counsel should bear the weight of liability
and penalties for acting in bad faith, as provided for in other aspects of the
Federal Rules. 228
CONCLUSION
Both debtors and creditors are entitled to equitable treatment and
protection throughout the reorganization process. The Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in In re S. White Transportation overprotects creditors to the
disadvantage of debtors by requiring, but not articulating, the need for more
than mere receipt of notice to meet the In re Ahern Enterprises participation
requirement. When debtors provide effective notice, they confer their
readiness to account for their debt and the security interests of their
creditors. To allow sophisticated creditors that “fell asleep at the switch” to
suddenly wake up and take action thwarts progress and incentivizes abuse
of procedure. Sophisticated creditors must be held to a higher standard of
scrutiny through a statutory or common-law definition that affords debtors a
defense. Without such a safeguard, proceedings are unnecessarily prolonged
and result in social and economic costs that run counter to the purpose of
Chapter 11 reorganization. Where effective disclosure is made to a
sophisticated creditor intimately involved with the debtor, as was the case
for the creditor Acceptance, mere receipt of notice is simply enough.
Liana-Marie Lien *

and equitable if payments to secured creditors amount to “at least the allowed amount of such
claim [or] at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.” Id.
§ 1129(2)(A)(i)(II). Unsecured creditors are entitled to the same right but subject to the interests
of those with greater priority. Id. § 1129(2)(B)(ii).
227. The Supreme Court determined that sophisticated creditors are still entitled to personal
service or notice, even if they are capable of discovering that their interests have or will be
affected. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983).
228. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (describing how attorneys may be sanctioned for
violations in representations to the court).
* B.S., Cornell University, 2009; J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015. Dedicated to
my loving parents, Steven and Lily Lien, who taught me early on never to wait until the last
minute to act. Thanks to my BLS family for the encouragement throughout this process; you are
the best friends a girl could ever ask for in law school. Special thanks to the members of the
Journal, especially Joshua Wueller and Elizabeth Schauber, for their hard work and support.

